Contrast and Comparison between Buddism and Islam Religions Thesis Proposal

Contrast and Comparison between Buddism and Islam Religions - Thesis Proposal Example On the other hand, Islam believes that a person has only one birth and he will get heaven or hell based on his activities in that birth. However, both religions have lot of similarities also. It should be noted that both Islam and Buddhism uphold the sanctity of good things and reject all kinds of sins. Both religions do believe that a human being will get salvation after his death if he does enough good things in his life. The fundamental beliefs and distinctions between Buddhism and Islam deal with a new way of life promoting freedom from confusion and disillusionment. While both religions require practice and faith in self, they worship in different methods but ultimately believe in similar facts. Islam believes in a superpower or God whereas Buddhists do not say much about the existence of God. Islam argues that everything in this universe, including human, is the creation of God. In their opinion, Allah the Almighty knows everything happening in this world. On the other hand, Buddhists talk about Karma or salvation. Buddhists argue that â€Å"If there were a creator of the world, he would be regarded as responsible for the suffering† (Harvey, p.36). In other words, Buddhists put the blame of human suffering upon the shoulder of the God. They argue that life itself is nothing but suffering and whatever the things we derive from this material world may bring sufferings ultimately. The activities in the previous birth may haunt a person in the present birth also and, hence, he may not be able to enjoy happiness until the salvation stage. They argue that human life will continue even after death but in different forms. In their opinion, the good or evil things done in th e humanly life decides whether the person get what kind of life after death. Buddhists argue that birth and rebirth continue until a person attains salvation. On the other hand, Islam opposes this view. In its teaching, happiness can be obtained

Classical Music, Beethoven, Verdi, & Wagner Essay

Classical Music, Beethoven, Verdi, & Wagner - Essay Example The word Romanticism originated from the age old chivalry and adventure which was rooted in the Middle Ages. Beethoven was much taken by the ideals of the enlightenment and by French Revolution in Europe and he believed in universal brotherhood. The Romantic Period consisted of the aesthetic approach, especially in literature, and other art forms. Beethoven was called a Romantic by his contemporaries such as Spohr and E.T.A. Hoffman. However, he was influenced by the Romantic Folk Idioms and he set dozens of Romantic poems for voice, piano, and violin. It was quite amazing that when Beethoven created his masterpieces, he was in distress burdened with many personal problems. But despite the conflicts in his life, he remained committed to the art and his legacy to the music form will ever remain unsurpassed   Giuseppe Verdi, who was more than a composer, was a dramatist, and an artist who used music as an instrument to convey the art of classical drama. His contributions to Classicis m were 28 Operas, which were purely dramatic compositions. â€Å"No one would ever accuse Giuseppe Verdi of being a classicist at heart but his string quartet has this same view at its heart-- it is an intimate home entertainment. Along with his 28 operas, Verdi wrote a famous Requiem and Four beautiful Sacred pieces for choir, a handful of occasional pieces and...one string quartet, not only his one piece of chamber music but his one and only piece of purely instrumental music.† (Mendelssohn, Verdi, Dvorak, 2002).  

Van Genneps Stages of a Rite of Passage

Van Genneps Stages of a Rite of Passage Van Genneps stages and understanding a rite of passage in relationship to one or more rituals Wittgenstein (1987, p.14, Chapter I. Introduction) set a large challenge for anthropology that has yet to be taken up. After reading the Golden Bough, he argues that Fraser made a crucial mistake by trying to deduce what things mean. He accused Fraser of not understanding that practices signify nothing but themselves, and that the extent of anthropology could be to delimit and work out the practical structure of such tasks. For the past fifty years or so, anthropology has largely ignored Wittgensteins remarks and has built an anthropology that privileges the observer. It privileges the observer because it is only the observer who can read into phenomenon their underlying socio-cultural meaning. It is precisely this sort of reifying reductionism that we find in Van Genneps (1909) theory of the rite of passage. Rites of passage present an irresistible and difficult focus for the ethnographer: they are constellations of compacted meanings removed from the process of everyday life. In the authors own experience, they are also some of the most frustrating things to analyse. Presented with so many unusual phenomenon, the ethnographer asks, what does this mask mean only for your informant to respond with a shrug. This difficulty of compacted meaning may partly explain why ethnographers are so quick to ignore the phenomenon involved in a rite of passage in favour of reading it as a structural process. This difficulty may also explain why, fully one hundred years after it was published, Van Genneps Rites of Passage theory remains unchallenged in the anthropological world. That said, Van Gennep’s overall structures has remained remarkably adept at matching up to all the rituals people apply to it. However, there should not be taken as a mark of its success. It one is to recall that the success of Evans-Pritchards structural-functionalism (Kuper: 1988, pp. 190-210, Chapter 10 Descent Theory: A Phoenix from the Ashes), was more based on the tastes and cultural paradigms of anthropologists than it was on its correspondence to any ethnographic reality. This essay will argue that Van Genneps stages of rites of passage do indeed cohere to many rituals, however, like Turners schemes (1995), these stages do little to explain to us the significance of ritual. In order to do so, this essay will argue, it is necessary to turn to how the phenomenologically experienced reality of ritual constitutes the social reality of a ritual. To make this argument this essay will focus on three rites of passage: French marriage ritual in Auvergne (Reed-Dahany: 1996), Yak a healing rituals in Zaire (Devisch: 1998, 1996) and refugee experience in Tanzania (Malikki: 1995). The last example proves the most difficult for Van Genneps theory: because though it corresponds to his stages, nothing about the experience of refugees would correspond to the socially rigid categories Van Gennep claims are central to rites of passage. From this example, this essay will argue to understand rites of passage we need to consider more fully the relationship of time-out-of-time in culture. For until we confront the question of what allows a certain unit of time to be taken out of the experience of the everyday, we will be no closer to understanding how rites of passage deal with other senses of time-out-of-time. Van Gennep (1909, Chapter I The Classification of Rites) attempts to demonstrate a there is a universal structure underlying all rites of passage. While there might be physiological, factors involved (e.g. coming to puberty) the mechanisms that determined the rites of passage are always social, and these social constructions display a cross-cultural similarity. Rituals and ceremonies in Van Gennep’s scheme serve the function of guaranteeing ones path through liminal transitory categories as one passes through the stages of separation, transition and reincorporation that he claims are present in all stages of rites of passage. What we can note about this model already is that the ritual serves the purpose of a unit of causation in a socially determinist model of society: there is a societal need that ritual fulfils. Because of this functional model, we are none the wiser as to how a society determines the exact elements of a ritual, or how people experience the ritual. Van Genneps approach is based on a socially functional model: though he is far more inclined to admit the power of the individual in the social form sui generis than is Durkheim (Zumwalt: 1982:304). That said, he still claims (Van Gennep, 1909, p. 72, Chapter Six Initiation Rites) that in mutilation: the mutilated individual is removed from the mass of common humanity by a rite of separation which automatically incorporates him into the defined group. His emphasis here is on the social end process: as if it could somehow be separated from the phenomenological experience of the pain. Thus, the process of scarification that marks many initiation rituals is merely placed as part of the logic of social cohesion: following such a pattern, it is hard to explain the beating and terror that often accompanies initiation rituals. Indeed, it ignores the central challenge Merleau-Ponty (1962, p.115, Part I The Body, Chapter III The Spatiality of Ones own Body and Motility) posed when he asked: H ow can we understand someone else without sacrificing him to our logic or it to him? The domain of phenomenology is closely linked to that of ritual. Jackson (1996, p.3, Chapter I Introduction) characterises phenomenology as a project designed to understand being-in-the-world. This attempt to understand how inter-subjective experience is constituted is a possible answer to the question Merleau-Ponty poses above how does one understand the other. Characteristically, phenomenology attempts to answer this project by not privileging one domain of experience or knowledge, as none of them can encompass the totality of the lived experience. Instead, it is an investigation into (Ricoeur, 1979, p.127, Chapter IV The Structure of Experience) the structures of experience which proceed connected expression in language. This is what Merleau-Ponty would call the preobjective. This understanding of the importance of structures that escape linguistic formalisation has also been part of the emphasis of the study of ritual in anthropology. In Levi-Strauss (1965, pp.167-186, Chapter Nine The Sorcerer and His Magic) classic examination of north American healing sorcerers he emphasises how the experience of the healing takes place between the triad of patient, sorcerer, and social body. He also emphasises the importance in this relationship of the sensory experience of the sorcerer. However, despite this emphasis, he is undertaking his analysis from a recorded text, and his emphasis is on the structural coherency sorcery provides rather than its embodied experience. He writes (ibid: 181): In a universe which it [the social body] strives to understand but whose dynamics it cannot fully control, normal thought continually seeks the meaning of things which refuse to reveal their significance. So-called pathological thought, on the other hand, overflows with emotion al interpretations and overtones, in order to supplement an otherwise deficient reality. The sensory experience of the ritual as understood by Levi-Strauss is constituted as a means-end relationship to get to the desired goal, the assertion of the cosmological unity of the social body. Here we can see the same pattern of assumptions about bodily meaning we noted earlier in Van Gennep. This emphasis, a legacy of Durkheim, characteristically means that repetition, often the element of ritual that constitutes its definition, is overlooked as window-dressing to the mythical meat of the ceremony which is that which can be vocalised (and thus objectified). This legacy can also be found in the two anthropologists whose writing about myth has defined the field, Van Gennep and Turner (1986, 1995). In Van Gennep, central to his notion of ritual as a rite of passage is a sacred-profane dualism, which is also kept in Turners scheme, though he also includes the notion of the marginal or liminal. In this distinction we can see that both theorists only deal with the relationship between the sacred and profane in terms of social structure and fail to deal with these elements interpenetrate in everyday lived reality. In a sense, their distinction is similar to that made by Mauss (1993, p. 12, Chapter I The Exchange of Gifts and the Obligation to Reciprocate) when understanding the gift. Mauss claims that the person for whom the sacrifice is performed enters the domain of the sacred and then rejoins the profane world, which is separate from the sacred, though conditioned by it. For Turners early work, and for Van Gennep, ritual is the heightened activity in which the sacred-profane worlds are mediated between. What is advantageous about these approaches is that they identify ritual as the situation or drama par excellence, as an organisation of practice constructed and defined by participants and it is a practice in which the participants confront the existential conditions of their existence. However, there are problems with Turner and Van Gennep’s approaches which parallel that of Levi-Strauss. In both cases, the emphasis is on the formal unity of the social world. Kapferer (1997, pp.55-61, Chapter II: Gods of Protection, Demons of Destruction: Sorcery and Modernity. The Transmutation of Suniyama: Difference and Repetition) illustrates some of these problems when analysing the Sri Lankan suniyama, or exorcisms. While he agrees with Turner that the suniyama constitute their own space-time, he also makes clear the extent to which they borrow from everyday life. Rather than seeing resolution and unity in the suniyama, he notes that the reactualisation of the ordinary world amid the virtuality of the rite is a moment of intense anxiety. In the events of the chedana vidiya, the tension, he argues, is not just about the destructive forces of the demon but also about the re-emergence of the victim in the ordered world. One can see in the suniyama that the lived world is not reducible to categories, despite the attempts at structuration. It is an excellent example of what Jackson (1989, p.5, Chapter I Paths Towards a Clearing) calls mans rage for order, and simultaneously usurpation of that order coupled with an awareness that the order is always exceeded by the lived world. Kapferer refuses to push dualistic or triadic models onto the Sri Lankan suniyama, and argue for it being a continuous process orientated at the restitution of social action. One of the ways this uncertainty the rage for order and its ambiguity or infirmity is manifested is in sensory experience. It is here that the Durkheimean project is unable to provide a satisfactory analytical framework and where phenomenology can provide some edifying lines of inquiry. None of these lines of inquiry are pursued by Reed-Dahany (1996), who illustrates the extent to which Van Gennep can be utilized, and also the extent to which Van Genneps scheme founders in its constructionist model, in her analysis of marriage practice in Auvergne. She notes that (ibid: 750) in the early morning after a wedding, a group of unmarried youths burst into the room to which the bride and groom have retired for the night and present them with a chamber pot containing champagne and chocolate. The youth and the newly wed couple then consume the chocolate and champagne together. The participants describe is as something which appears disgusting, and yet actually tastes really good. Reed-Dahany utilises Bourdieus work on taste to show how this reversal of the established bourgeois order simultaneously parodies marriage and bourgeois taste. Like the examples we see in Turners work, the sacred ritual of marriage here is associated with the inversion of established meanings only for these meanings to be ever more forcefully reinserted after the period of liminal disaggregation. We can see how such a ritual fits Van Genneps scheme very well: the couple are segregated from society (both from each other before marriage, and then from society the honeymoon afterwards) before being reaggregated. Thus, Reed-Dahany has no problem in understanding the ritual of la rà ´tie as a ritual of reincorporation in the sense Turner had meant it. Through the partaking of food with the unwed they are allowed to re-enter society, the wet-substance consumed standing in for fecundity. Indeed, as Reed-Dahany notes (ibid: 752) Van Gennep himself had commented on these rituals in his work on folk customs in rural France and had pursued much the same conclusion. Yet what Reed-Dahany notes is that the focus for the people involved in the ritual are the scatological reference implicit in the ritual: these elements of parody of bourgeois society that take place at the level of bodily praxis are left unexplained by Van Genneps scheme, in which any set of symbols is replaceable with anot her as long as they have the same social purpose. This is why Van Gennep has great problems explaining rites of passage that are not formal. Yet, it is not the case that rites of passage and other temporal markers must be institutionalised. As Malikki (1995, p. 241, Chapter Six Cosmological Order of Nations) notes: historical consciousness is lodged within precarious accidental processes that are situated and implicated in the lived events and local processes of the everyday. In her work, Malikki looks at the creation of a mythico-history among Hutu refugees who fled the mass killing of 1972 in Burundi for Tanzania fifteen years ago. She contrasts two groups; the first, living in an urban environment, deploy their ethnicity and history only rarely, situationally and relationally, and attempt not to stick out. In contrast, at the refugee camp, the inhabitants were continually engaged in recreating their homeland. Malikki (ibid: p.3, Introduction An Ethnography of Displacement in the National order of Things) notes: The camp refugees saw themselves as a nation in exile, and defined exile, in turn, as a moral trajectory of trials and tribulations that would ultimately empower them to reclaim, or recreate anew, the homeland in Burundi. One of the noticeable elements in this construction of a mythico-history is the way in which it internalised exterior categories, and then subverted them. For instance, Malikki draws attention to the way in the powerful discourse of inter-nationalism, refugees are in an ambiguous space, particularly polluting, between national boundaries. Malikki uses the work of Van Gennep and Turner to understand how the Hutu refugees in the camp had turned this liminal space into a trial of separation, which would empower them to return. The narratives that people told Malikki were incredibly standardised, they functioned, as Malikki notes, as moral lessons, that represented (ibid: p. 54, Chapter Two The Mythico History) a subversive recasting and reinterpretation of [events] it in fundamentally moral ways. In Malikkis work, we can see that rites of passage can be lodged in accidental processes and contingent historical events. Even here, they seem to fit the categories of Van Genneps classificati on. However, one notes that nothing about these classifications explains the way these patterns were then sedimented into a rite of passage that structured and organised practice. She notes that one of the key moments in this history is when the refugees arrive across the border in Tanzania, and are able to meet other refugees from Burundi (there appeared to be little widespread national connections before then ibid: p.103, Chapter Two The Mythico History). Thus, collective effervescence of consciousness, which, as the narrative describes, allowed people to understand the final secret of the Tutsis, was not just experienced verbally. The supplanting of the social order with chaos (though an ordered chaos) was accompanied by very physical processes. The fear of pursuit, the bodily feeling of cramp and hunger, the sight of corpses on the road: all these were processes that the refugees took great pains to describe to Malikki. The refugees referred to this moment as one of revelation, and this memory, which must have in part formed the social bond that allowed for the creation of the mythico-history, was a silent history of bodily feeling and gesture as much as i t was one verbalised. If we develop Malikkis understanding of the similarity between rites of passage and the refugee experience slightly, there is a parallel between the symbolic death and rebirth in the liminal stage of separation in a rite of passage, normally accompanied by ritual action that provides the unity of a shared painful experience, and the collective pain of that crossing into Tanzania in 1972. These phenomenological bodily experienced realities are not marginal to a group feeling of cohesion: rather than social aspects of the rite of passage stem from these silent memories of bodily experience. We will now turn to an analysis of the rites of passage in the Yaka healing cults of Zaire. In contrast to the social world of the Yaka, which is patrilineal, femaleness, uterine filiation and mediatory roles are cyclical and occupy a concentric life-cycle (Devisch: 1996, p.96, The Cosmology of Life Transmission). It is within this contrast that the healing rituals takes place. The healing rituals a re not a collection or commiseration, rather, they are bodily and sensuous, they (ibid: 95) aim at emancipating the initiates destiny clearing and enhancing the lines of force in the wider weave of family. It is not just in the matrilineage that healing occurs however, for (Devisch: 1998, p.127, Chapter Six Treating the affect by remodelling the body in a Yaka Healing Cult) it is in the interplay of physical links and individualising relationships a person weaves through his mothers lineage with the uterine sources of life and the primary and fusional object that the Yaka cultures in Kinshasa and south-west Congo localise the origin of serious illness, infirmity and madness. The ritual allows for the rebirth of the individual, and occurs at the margins (physical and cultural) of the society. This re-sourcing of the body is very fundamentally sensory. For instance, in the period of seclusion a young Mbwoolu become body doubles, and become an inscribed body envelope that serves as his interface with the social body. It is important to note there that the Yaka identity is structured as an envelope and knot. Harmful things like thievery of sorcery are associated with this knot being tied too tightly or loosely, inversion of normal bodily functions, such as flatulence or ejaculation outside of coitus can be understood as the knot being tied too tightly or gently. The person in this sense is constructed inter-subjectively, spreading outwards in a myriad of exchanges and well formed knots. The transference to the Mbwoolu involves an enacted cosmology where the objects and the initiate are covered with a red paste. Devisch notes that the notion of the person in these ceremonies is to be found to be located at the skin level, through a myriad of exchanges. At an early stage in the ritual, the initiates and the Mbwoolu figurines are floated in water, and this is the beginning of a process that continues throughout the ritual, as the initiates skin is turned inside out. In this process, the illness is displaced onto the Mbwoolu, and his insides become a receptacle for the power of the healing ritual. The figurines become a social skin to be idealised, socialised and protected. The importance of sensory experience in the ritual is also in the moment where the master shaman bites off the head of a chicken and sprays the initiates with its blood. Devisch (ibid: 146) also talks about the importance of the fusional absorption in the rhythm and music, then (ibid) [the] tactile olfactory and auditory contacts envelop, and are finally interwoven into an increasingly elaborate utterance, by the mirrored gaze. By this Devisch is alluding to the process by which the initiate converts the primary fusional object into phenomena of identification by incorporation. In this process of incorporating the figurine into themselves, all the senses are in use. What is noteworthy and excellent in Devischs work is that while he does occasionally lapse into statements about trance-inducing music, she is clear to emphasise that sensual phenomenon are not part of a means-end relationship to induce the required result, nor are they somehow secondary to the meaning of the ritual. Rath er, he emphasises that the sensory experience is in many respects, the ritual that the experience of being covered in red clay and submerged in water and having your skin reversed cannot be separated from the transference of your illness to the statues. What Mauss (1993, p.2, Chapter I The Exchange of Gifts and the Obligation to Reciprocate) was right to emphasise when he claimed sacrifice was a total social fact was that questions of sacrifice are questions of Being first and foremost. They occupy a place were the social world is made and remade. In Devisch, what is understood to constitute the central aspects of the Yaka healing cult are sensory experience. This is very different to the understanding laid out by Van Gennep and Turner. For while Devisch makes clear that in the Yaka healing cult one is separated from society pending ones reincorporation, he does not allow the socially functional explanation to obscure what the ceremony might mean. One can see the difference if we contrast Turners work to Devischs. For Turner, the performative and sensory aspects of healing function at its normative pole, the pole at which ritual healing is a resolution of social and emotional conflict. The power of dominant symbols, for Turner, derived from their capacity to condense structural or moral norms the eidetic pole and fuse them with physiological and sensory phenomena and processes – the oretic pole. In Turner, the oretic pole, where emotional and bodily praxis is centred, is a given. For Devisch, this given in Turners work is a critical problem, for it prevents his understanding that the basis of creativity in ritual (1993, p.37, 1.6 Body and Weave: A Semantic-Praxilogical Approach) is to be sought not in liminality but in the body seen as a surface upon which the group and the life-world is inscribed. We have seen in three rituals how Van Genneps classification superficially fits the pattern of behaviour. However, like in the work of Victor Turner, we have seen that Van Gennep cannot explain the detail of rites of passage using his system of classification. In his system, the details of a ceremony become marginal, whereas for the practioners they are central. To explain such details we need to pursue a phenomenologically informed anthropology such as that which Devisch practices. For if a rites of passage is a primarily embodied experience, then the body cannot simply be a receptacle for social value rather, one would argue, it can also be a generative movement, both of meaning and of experience Bibliography Devisch, R. 1998: Treating the affect by remodelling the body in a Yaka healing cult. In Strathern Lambek, Bodies and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Devisch, R. The Cosmology of Life Transmission. pp.94-115. In, Jackson, M. (ed) 1996: Things as they are: New Directions in Phenomenological Anthropology. Indiana: Indiana University Press. Devisch, R. 1993: Weaving the Threads of Life: The Khita Gyn-Eco-Logical Healing cult among the Yaka. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Jackson, M. 1989: Paths Towards a Clearing. Indiana: Indiana University Press. Jackson, M. (ed) 1996: Things as they are: New Directions in Phenomenological Anthropology. Indiana: Indiana University Press. Kuper, A. 1988. The Invention of primitive society: transformations of an illusion. London: Routledge Kapferer, B. 1997: The Feast of the Sorcerer: Practices of Consciousness and Power Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Levi-Strauss, C. 1965. Structural Anthropology 1. London: Penguin. Malikki, L. 1995: Purity and Exile: Violence, memory and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania. London: University College Press. Mauss, M. 1993: The Gift: The Form and Reason for exchange in Archaic Societies. London: Routledge. Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962 Phenomenology of perception. London : Routledge Reed-Dahany, D. 1996: Champagne and Chocolate: Taste and Inversion in a French wedding ritual. American Anthropologist. Vol. 98, No. 4, pp. 750-761. Ricoeur, P. 1979: Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning. Texas: Christian University Press. Turner, V.W. 1995: The Ritual Process: Structure and anti-structure. London: Aldine. Turner, V.W. 1986. The drums of affliction. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Van Gennep, A. 1909: The Rites of Passage. London: Routledge. Wittgenstein, L. 1987: Remarks on Frazers Golden Bough. London: Brynmill Press. Zumwalt, R. 1982: Arnold Van Gennep: The Hermit of Bourd-la-Reine. American Anthropologist. Vol 84, No 2, pp. 299-313.

Themes Of Bob Dylans Music Essay -- essays research papers

Bob Dylan was recognized by his poetry and song writing. He usually wrote songs about protesting and religious themes. Although the theme of Bob Dylan’s work is depressing, it is necessary to consider how the events in his life affected his music. Also Bob Dylan had other musicians that influenced him in his early years.Bob Dylan was born in Duluth Minnesota on the date of May 24th 1941. By the time he was ten years old he was writing poems and had taught himself to play guitar. He later changed his name from Robert Allen Zimmerman to the famous name Bob Dylan. In 1962 Bob visited his big early influence Woodie Guthrie in the hospital. Finally Bob Dylan got to meet him and become friends with his lost idol who was slowly dying of Huntington’s disease in Morristown, New Jersey, Dylan had written him a song called song to Woody. A famous quote from this song is â€Å"Bout a funny old world that’s coming along. Seems sick and it’s hungry, it’s tired and it’s torn, it looks like it’s dying and it’s hardly been born.†After he graduated high school in the early 1959 Dylan found himself playing folk music. This is also the time he began to write his legendary folk songs. In the 1960s Bob Dylan had turned the themes of his music to protest what many people consider the wrongs of society. In his songs he writes about the â€Å"luckless, the abandoned and’ forsaken,† as he put it in â€Å"chimes of Freedom.† He condemned the Ku Klux Klan in â€Å"The Death of Emmett Till† and the John Birchites in â€Å"Talking’ John Birch Paranoid Blues.† In Masters of War†he damned the war makers. And in Blowing’ in the wind, â€Å"he created probably his most famous song, though Dylan once stated that he wrote that song just for his friends. In fact, this anti racist, antiwar anthem is, in its deepest sense, a subtitle plea for awareness. (â€Å"How many times must a man look up/ Before he can see the sky? / Yes ‘n’ how many ears must one man have/ before he can hear people cry?†) Dylan had the characteristics of a biblical prophet, but also he had a sense of humor and irony (â€Å"Talking Bear Mountain Picnic Massacre Blues†). One soon started to notice that he was a beginning to write songs that saw the world as consisting not just of heroes and villains but mostly cowardly people caught up in all-to-human situations. In the song â€Å"Who killed Davey Moore?† Dave Moore was a boxer who got killed by another boxer in... ...ngled Up in Blue,† â€Å"Idiot Wind,† â€Å"Simple Twist of Fate† and â€Å"Shelter From the Storm.† Dylan’s greatest album to date.In 1977 Dylan and Sara divorced and in 1978 he acted in the movie â€Å"Renaldo & Clara† and that same year converted to Christianity. In 1985 he performed at â€Å"Live Aid† and â€Å"Farm Aid† and contributed to â€Å"We Are the World.† In 1970 Dylan received an Honorary Doctorate of Music from Princeton University. In 1988 Dylan was introduced to the R&R Hall of Fame. In 1991 Dylan received a Grammy Award for â€Å"Lifetime Achievement.† In 1997 Kennedy Center Honors Dylan for achievement in the arts. President Clinton stated, â€Å"He probably had more impact on people of my generation than any other creative artist.† In 1998 he was the winner of three Grammy awards in major categories for â€Å"Time Out of Mind†: The album of the Year, Best Male Contemporary Rock Vocal Performance, and Best Contemporary Folk Album. In 2000 Dylan is awarded â€Å"The Polar Music Prize† by the Royal Swedish Academy of Music for his â€Å"indisputable influence on the development of 20th century popular music as a singer-songwriter. They also nominated Dylan for the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1997, 1998 and 1999.

The Katrina Breakdown

The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina may be remarked as a very important aspect to understand the relationship between federal, state, and local governments when it comes to major catastrophe. In Katrina’s case, federalism is seen as central to what was largely a government-created disaster. Numerous scientific articles are trying to offer various interpretations of what went wrong and why; however, out of all perspectives, I find Stephen Griffin’s argument most persuasive. Yes, I may agree with Martha Derthick that there were both success and failures in governmental responses to the disaster, but I also find this idea less persuasive because there were more failures than successful responses. I may agree with Marc Landy’s position that federalism was put to a difficult test that required effective decisions, speed and coordination, and I agree that some citizens were not cooperating with the mandatory evacuation orders and consequently were the ones to blame. However, Griffin’s examples of governmental failure show something valuable about the nature of federalism. First of all, he proves that federalism is not simply about the fact of the existence of federal and state governments. Federalism is also about localism. Despite being dependent for their legal authority on state governments, local governments have substantial legal and political authority. Prior to Katrina, federal disaster policy had been based formally on the idea that local governments knew local conditions best. However, one of the most unusual characteristics of Hurricane Katrina was how it blasted away the entire local government infrastructure in New Orleans. It challenged assumptions as to how the federal structure needed to operate, not just during a crisis, but also in preparing for crisis situations. It also removed the basis on which the National Response Plan was built. Second, the failure to respond to the disaster exposed one of the few real structural weaknesses in the U. S. Constitution – a mechanism to coordinate the work of local, state and national governments. While Washington had difficulty making long-range plans, coordinating its actions and political decisions, local, state and federal officials were debating over who was in charge. The fractured division of responsibility – Governor Blanco controlled state agencies and the National Guard, Mayor Nagin directed city workers, and the head of FEMA, Mr. Brown, served as the point man for the federal government – meant no one was in charge. For example, the evacuation was delayed unnecessarily because the federal and state governments could not communicate effectively about who was supposed to provide transportation. It meant that officials were unaware that there were thousands of people without food, water, or bare necessities. The consequences of this governmental paralysis were appalling human suffering and the humiliation of the U. S. government in the eyes of the nation and the whole world. Another part of the problem was that the scale of devastation was vast. It appeared that Katrina was beyond the capacity of the state and local governments, and it was beyond the capacity of FEMA. Federal authorities were waiting for state authorities who were supposed to combine local decisions to request resources in an emergency. However, when local governments and communications had been wiped out, state authorities did not know what to request. The extent of the crisis meant that state officials were unable to cope. In other words, when the crisis hit, different agencies could not communicate with one another due to different types of systems. When in fact, Katrina was a national problem and could only be solved by a national mandate. It seems that the federal system must be a certain way because it has always been that way – it is a system that the founding generation designed and thought was well-justified. Among other effects, this saves officials from having to fully confront their own responsibility for how the system is run. In Katrina’s case, for instance, there was no justification for allowing local and state authorities to fight for years over who was going to buy which communications system. They should have not fight over the idea of how the block grants needed to be distributed. Indeed, they would not have been able to fight at all were it not for the federal dollars they were receiving. Unless some institutional and constitutional lessons of Katrina are learnt, if another terroristic event, or a massive earthquake, or even another hurricane happens, we will get the same ill-coordinated response. We need to stop our customary thinking about what federalism is and what it requires in order to prevent another disaster. The formal structure that does carry over from the eighteenth century is misleading because it has been supplemented and subtly altered by continuous institutional change. To quote Stephen Griffin: â€Å"The federal system as it exists today is our system, not that of the founding generation. â€Å"We† – generations still alive – created it and we are continuing to change it. † In any event, if this system is ours, we are responsible for its successful operation and we can decide to change it for good and sufficient reasons.

Financial Planning Essay

To inform the audience about how small sacrifices today can result in huge dividends in retirement. Thesis: Today I will inform the audience of the power of saving small amounts of money for the future and how compound interest works in their favor when they start saving as soon as possible. Organizational Pattern: Topical Introduction A. Attention Getter Who wants to be a millionaire? You can be!!! Social Security will very likely NOT be available to people currently younger than 40 and if it does survive will not be a significant amount to live on. How we prepare NOW can determine whether we are world travelers or Walmart greeters. C. Credibility My father impressed upon me the need for financial planning. I began saving when I first started working at 17 and have benefitted greatly. D. Thesis Today I will show how anyone can have a rewarding future by making small and often unnoticed sacrifices currently. E. Preview Specifically, I will discuss retirement saving strategies including 401K matching programs from employees and IRA’s. Transition First I will discuss the expediency of saving at an early age. I. Body A. When to start saving for retirement? 1. The earlier the better. Due to the exponential nature of compound interest the longer the money remains the more significant the growth 2. It’s never too late to start saving for retirement. The problem is the longer you wait the more impact on your budget due to having to save a higher percentage of your current income. If you start saving early your impact is minimized greatly. Transition Next, I will discuss the various ways to save for retirement. 1. 401K plans offer you the chance to deduct monies from your paycheck either before taxes are deducted or afterward. Each option has tax 2. advantages but their impact is geared toward current tax savings or tax savings during retirement. The real opportunity in 401K is the employee match program where your employer invests the same amount into your account, usually up to a certain percentage. . Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) are another way to save for retirement. They can be used independently or in conjunction with a 401K plan. Funds are deposited after taxes have been withheld so there is no tax due upon withdrawal in retirement. IRA contributions can be withdrawn without penalty if you face a financial hardship such as losing your home or significant medical bills. Transition My final point is a strategy that can meet your goal while minimizing impact on your current lifestyle. 1. Many of you are working toward new careers and excited about that first REAL paycheck. 2. If you â€Å"forget† about the percentage of your check that is going into the 401K and structure your budget on the remaining amount you will find saving easy and rewarding. 3. Begin with 3% of your pay going into retirement savings. Each raise/promotion you get increase it by 1% until you have reached your employer’s maximum match rate. Then add the 1% into an IRA until you have reached the percentage that results in your desired retirement account. I have discussed when to start saving for retirement, various ways to save as well as methods for minimizing the impact on your current budget. B. I trust that now you are more informed about the rewards available in the future when you start saving now and have obtained information about ways to achieve your goals. References Ira online resource guide.